Employment Law Survey by Grossman, Daniel
Denver Law Review 
Volume 70 
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 12 
January 2021 
Employment Law Survey 
Daniel Grossman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel Grossman, Employment Law Survey, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 753 (1993). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
EMPLOYMENT LAW SURVEY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with several difficult
issues in 1992. The employment cases decided by the court mostly dealt
with procedural due process in public employment. The court contin-
ued its narrow construction of the procedural rights of government em-
ployees. It applied a high standard necessary for plaintiffs to establish a
protected property interest and established a low standard for defend-
ants to meet to comply with Fourteenth Amendment requirements. In
Brown v. Independent School District No. 1-06,1 the court narrowly construed
the word "termination" in a statute protecting school employees from
arbitrary discharge so as to exclude employees with contracts not re-
newed by the school district. In Driggins v. City of Oklahoma City, 2 the
court held personnel policies enacted by city officials protecting city em-
ployees did not override employment-at-will provisions of the
Oklahoma City Charter. Similarly, in Phillips v. Calhoun 3 the court held a
section of the city code which transferred the plaintiff into a protected
classification did not override the at-will provisions of the city charter.
But in Patrick v. Miller,4 a merit clause of the city charter was found to
take precedence over other at-will language of the charter.
In 1992 the Tenth Circuit also considered using a Title VII analogy
to resolve issues arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act in both the substantive and procedural context. In Oestman v. Na-
tional Farmers Union Insurance Co. ,5 the court applied the same test used in
Title VII discrimination cases to determine whether a plaintiff is an em-
ployee protected by the Act or an unprotected independent contractor.
The court rejected the Title VII analogy in the statute of limitations con-
text in Aronson v. Gressly.
6
II. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND DUE PROCESS
Government employees found the Tenth Circuit unreceptive to
their claims in 1992. It narrowly defined "property interest" and re-
laxed its standard of procedural due process to restrict governmental
employee rights in the termination context.
A. Defining Property Interest
Through the use of Section 1983, 7 government employees have
1. 974 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1992).
2. 954 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. 956 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1992).
4. 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992).
5. 958 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992).
6. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 states:
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availed themselves of the protections in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a weapon against workplace discrimination.
Under the Supreme Court's rulings in Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill,8 and Board of Regents v. Roth, 9 plaintiffs must show (1) that
they had a protected property interest in continued employment'0 and
(2) that they were deprived of such interest without due process of law
as defined in Mathews v. Eldridge." In 1992 the Tenth Circuit used a
literal interpretation of the standard set forth in Loudermill, Roth and
Matthews in establishing a property interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1. Tenth Circuit Case Law
The classic case where the courts are unwilling to find a protected
property interest in continued employment is a complaining employee
under a definite-term contract that is not renewed by the government
entity. In that situation, the employee has no reasonable expectation of
continued employment and is unprotected from non-renewal. This
principle guided the court's analysis in Brown v. Independent School District
No. 1-06.120utside of the classic scenario, the court used a formalistic
interpretation of municipal and state law to reject constitutional claims
in Driggins v. City of Oklahoma City 13 and Phillips v. Calhoun.1 4 But in Pat-
rick v. Miller,15 the court resolved a conflict among city charter provi-
sions in favor of a complaining employee.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
8. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). Loudermill was hired as a security guard by the Cleveland
Board of Education. On his application he indicated that he had never been convicted of a
felony. The Board subsequently discovered that he had been convicted of larceny, a fel-
ony under Ohio law, and terminated him. Loudermill filed suit complaining that the
Board's summary dismissal of him without any pre-termination hearing or procedure vio-
lated his due process rights. Because he was a classified civil servant under Ohio law, the
Court held that he could only be terminated for cause and was entitled to a pre-termina-
tion opportunity to respond and a post-termination administrative review.
9. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Court held that Roth, a teacher employed under a one-
year contract by a state college, failed to establish a protected property interest because he
had not acquired tenure according to Wisconsin law. The Court also held that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not require an opportunity for a hearing prior to the non-renewal
of a nontenured teacher's contract, where, as here, the teacher fails to come forward with
evidence of stigma or disability foreclosing other employment or terms of his employment
conferring a protected property interest.
10. Employees often assert state statutes, city ordinances, city charters or employment
contracts as a source of protected property interest in procedural due process cases. See
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 513-21 (4th ed. 1991).
11. 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976). In Eldridge, the Court held that the interests of the
government in obtaining a summary decision in the dispute must be balanced against the
dangers of arbitrary or erroneous decisions inherent in a summary proceeding in deter-
mining whether Due Process requirements have been met.
12. 974 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1992).
13. 954 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1992).
14. 956 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1992).
15. 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992).
[Vol. 70:4
EMPLOYMENT IA W
a. Brown v. Independent School District No. 1-065
The plaintiffs were employed as secretaries of an Oklahoma school
district. 16 Both worked in that capacity for many years and were parties
to a series of one-year employment contracts. 17 In June of 1989, the
school board voted not to enter into new contracts with the employ-
ees. 18 The employees sought a hearing with the board to discuss the
reasons for its decision not to renew their contracts and were refused.
The board also refused to offer any reasons for their decision. 19 The
employees then sued and the district court granted the board's motion
for summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs had no protected prop-
erty interest in continued employment with the school district.
20
On appeal, the employees argued that Oklahoma statutes as well as
the school board's policy created a sufficient basis to assert a constitu-
tionally protected property interest. The statutory provision prohibited
the suspension, demotion or termination of certain employees the plain-
tiffs except "for cause."' 2 1 The court held that termination, for the pur-
poses of the statute, does not include the natural death of the contract.
22
Therefore, the "for cause" language did not apply to the decision not to
renew the employees' contract and the employees could not claim a
property right on that basis.
23
The employees then asserted a property right based on the school
board policy contained in an employee handbook. "The continuation of
employment shall be based on the quality of work, ethical conduct, ne-
cessity of the work and the availability of district funds."' 24 The Tenth
Circuit held that the handbook only restated the termination require-
ments in the statute and did not apply to the natural death of the con-
tract.2 5 The handbook was not sufficient to create a property interest
protected by procedural due process.
b. Driggins v. City of Oklahoma City
In Driggins v. City of Oklahoma City,26 the Tenth Circuit held that city
personnel policies requiring employees be discharged only "for cause"
do not negate contradictory city charter provisions. 27 The Oklahoma
16. Brown, 974 F.2d at 1238.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1239.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-101.40 (Supp. 1993). The statute reads:
A support employee who has been employed by a local board of education for
more than one (1) year shall be subject to suspension, demotion or termination
only for cause, as designated by the policy of the local board of education ....
This section shall not be construed to prevent layoffs for lack of funds or work.
22. Brown, 974 F.2d at 1240.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1240-41. "[W]e interpret the provision to refer to termination of an ex-
isting contract rather than to a failure to renew a contract."
26. 954 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 1514-15.
1993]
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City Charter provided that city employees could be terminated for any
reason construed to be in the interest of the service.2 8 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court had previously held that city employees working under
the "interest of service" provisions of a city charter did not have a prop-
erty interest subject to due process protection.2 9 In Driggins, the Tenth
Circuit agreed that such provisions in the charter precluded the plaintiff
from claiming a protected property interest in continued employment.
3 0
The plaintiff in Driggins was an employee of the City of Oklahoma
City as a human resources specialist. At the time of termination, the
plaintiff was a six-year employee of the city.3 ' Driggins argued three
factual bases for constitutional protection from termination without pro-
cedural due process: (1) City Council regulations suggest that city em-
ployees could only be discharged "for cause;" (2) an informal but
mutual understanding existed between Driggins and the city that she
was a permanent employee and could only be terminated for cause; and
(3) as an employee of a federally funded Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA) program,3 2 Driggins had a protected property
interest "by virtue of CETA's mandate that participating state and local
governments adopt a merit[-based] personnel system."
33
The trial judge submitted the question of Driggins's possible consti-
tutionally protected property interest in continued employment with the
city to the jury, which found in the affirmative.3 4 The Tenth Circuit re-
versed, holding that when a city charter contains a provision empower-
ing the city manager to terminate employees "for the good of the
service," the existence of a protected property interest should be deter-
mined by the court as a matter of law.35 The Tenth Circuit then re-
viewed the issue de novo and held that, given the city charter provisions,
Driggins did not have a protected property interest in continued em-
ployment with the city.
3 6
The court reasoned that, with the aforementioned city charter pro-
visions and the charter's grant of all authority in employment decisions
to the city manager, the city council resolution establishing a "for cause"
personnel policy did not bind the city and did not establish a property
interest for due process purposes.
3 7
The court also rejected the plaintiff's second argument for the
existence of a mutual understanding that she would only be terminated
28. Id. at 1514. The court noted that Article III, Sec. 1 of the Oklahoma City Charter
states that "removals and demotions shall be made solely for the good of the service."
29. Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196 (Okla. 1980).
30. Driggins, 954 F.2d at 1514-15.
31. Id. at 1512.
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 802-992 (1975). CETA has since been repealed, Pub. L. No. 97-300,
§ 184(a)(1), 96 Stat. 1357 (1982), but the plaintiff was employed while the Act was still in
effect. See Driggins, 954 F.2d at 1515.
33. Driggins, 954 F.2d at 1515.
34. The reported opinion does not cite to the district court opinion nor does it delve
into the reasoning of the jurors in finding that such a property interest existed.
35. Driggns, 954 F.2d at 1513.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1514.
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for just cause that would establish a protected property interest.3 8 The
court recognized the fact that mutual understandings can be the source
of a property interest,3 9 but refused to recognize such an interest here:
Driggins points to no authority, however, for the proposition
that mutually explicit understandings can give rise to a pro-
tected property interest where an express city charter provision
allows employees to be discharged "solely for the good of the
service."
4 0
Finally, the court held that Driggins failed to point to any provision
of CETA which imposed substantive restrictions on city officials in ter-
minating employees. The court reasoned that even if CETA conferred
additional rights on employees after its repeal, it did not confer a pro-
tected property interest in continued employment to city employees.
4 1
c. Phillips v. Calhoun
Under a similar fact. situation, the court found no protected prop-
erty interest in continued employment in Phillips v. Calhoun.42 In Phillips,
the city charter of Sand Springs, Oklahoma contained language identical
to that found in the Oklahoma City Charter in Driggins. A city attorney
38. Id. at 1515.
39. Id. The court cited Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 430 (10th Cir. 1984), for the
proposition that mutual understanding "can create a property interest in continued em-
ployment by means of an implied contract." In Vinyard, a hospital's director of volunteer
services successfully argued that a protected property interest in continued employment
had been created by the hospital when it distributed an employee handbook. Id.
40. Driggins, 954 F.2d at 1515.
41. Id. at 1516.
42. 956 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1992). An interesting variation on this theme was set out
by the court in Farnsworth v. Town of Pinedale, 968 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1992). In Farns-
worth the court affirmed the district court's granting of defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
Farnsworth and other city employees claimed that they were discharged without any
procedure after a municipal election. Id. Immediately following the election, the new
mayor and two new councilmen voted to repeal certain personnel policies and not to reap-
point plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs objected claiming that they had a protected property interest
in continued employment with the city that could not be revoked without due process of
law. Id.
While the Tenth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs had established a constitutionally
protected property interest, the court found that such interest did not extend beyond the
term of the political officials who appointed them. In construing several provisions of the
Wyoming statutes to preclude town councilmen and mayors from making appointments
which are for a duration longer than their own terms of office, the court rejected plaintiffs'
§ 1981 claims:
Appellants ... possessed a constitutionally protected property right in continued
employment. However, that right extended only until the end of their term of
office, at which time the incoming mayor and town council had the option to
replace them by the authority granted by Wyoming Statute § 15-2-102(a).
Id. at 1057.
As in Driggins and Phillips, the court in this case concentrated on the formalistic munic-
ipal procedures to determine the extent of the protected property interest. There were
several ambiguities and contradictions in the Wyoming statutory scheme. To affirm sum-
mary judgment in this case seems to imply that the existence and the extent of a constitu-
tionally protected property interest in continued employment will always be a question of
law to be decided by the judge, completely taking the expectations, no matter how reason-
able, of the plaintiff/government employee out of the due process analysis. This is an
unfortunate result. See discussion infra section I.A.2.
1993]
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filed a § 1983 claim for wrongful discharge claiming that some proce-
dural safeguards granted by the charter to classified employees created a
protected property interest in continued employment.
The district court held as a matter of law that the plaintiff was an
unclassified employee and, therefore, granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that even if he was
an unclassified employee under the charter, § 2-617 of the city cod,
"subsequently effected his transfer into the classified service."14 3 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit held that such a classification was contrary to th
city charter and was therefore a nullity, leaving plaintiff with no pro-
tected property interest in that the "for the good of the service" lan-
guage of the charter "[did] not create a cognizable interest in
employment."
44
d. Patrick v. Miller
In Patrick v. Miller,45 a Tenth Circuit panel headed by Judge Brorby
held that an at-will city charter provision did not defeat the plaintiff's
claim to a protected property interest when another provision of the
charter required employment decisions be made on merit alone.
4 6
The trial judge denied Miller's motion for summary judgment on
Patrick's § 1983 claim and the defendants appealed.4 7 Judge Brorby
reasoned that if precedent allowed city charter provisions confer com-
plete discretion in employee discharges that would necessarily defeat
any claims of protection from wrongful discharge, the converse must
also be true:
Where a city charter restricts a city manager's authority to ter-
minate employees, Oklahoma courts would not allow city offi-
cials to alter those terms so as to expand their authority to the
detriment of employees. City employees therefore have a legit-
imate expectation of continued employment to the extent that a
city charter limits its officials' power to terminate such
employment.
48
The panel upheld the district court's refusal to grant summary judg-
ment on plaintiff's section 1983 claim.
4 9
2. Analysis
In rejecting the protected property claims in Brown and Driggins, the
Tenth Circuit went to great lengths to trammel government employees'
due process rights. The court held that when there is an at-will or
equivalent provision in a city charter, the question of the existence of a
protected property interest is a matter of law to be decided by the court.
43. Phillips, 956 F.2d at 952.
44. Id. at 953.
45. 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992).
46. Id. at 1245.
47. Id. at 1242.
48. Id. at 1244-45.
49. Id. at 1246.
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The court in Driggins relied primarily on city charter provisions and a
restrictive Oklahoma Supreme Court decision interpreting those provi-
sions50 permitting the termination of employees for the good of the ser-
vice. The court elevated these obscure city charter "at-will" and "good
of the service" caveats to complete disclaimer status revoking any due
process rights granted by the city to its employees.
The court ruled this way despite the fact that the Supreme Court
cases in this area turn on the mutual expectations of the government
and its employees, rather than the formal authority of city officials.
5 '
While the court correctly addressed the issue of whether Oklahoma state
law conferred a property right upon the plaintiffs in Driggins and Phillips,
it ignored the fact that such a protected interest may also be created by
contract or mutual understanding.
52
The Supreme Court has afforded the circuits the opportunity to
broadly interpret property interests for due process purposes and it is
troubling that the Tenth Circuit discarded the logic and spirit of the
mutual understanding doctrine in favor of a formalistic interpretation of
municipal authority. State cases within the Tenth Circuit that have ad-
dressed the issue of at-will employees' enforcement of procedural bene-
fits promised subsequent to the commencement of employment have
held that the expectations of the employee create the procedural
rights. 5 3 Such a rule is as logical as it is equitable and should be
adopted by the Tenth Circuit.
Although the court used the same analysis in Patrick that it used in
Driggins and Phillips (that the provisions of the city charter are control-
ling), the decision was different. The court found that, unlike the char-
ter in Driggins, the Norman City Charter in Patrick provided that
50. O'Keefe, supra note 29. It should also be noted that the Tenth Circuit previously
held that the "for the good of the service" language found in city charters does not confer
a property interest to city employees. See Campbell v. Mercer, 926 F.2d 990 (10th Cir.
1991); Lane v. Town of Dover, 761 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Okla. 1991), aff'd, 951 F.2d 291
(10th Cir. 1991).
51. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 344 n.6 (1976), Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) ("[a] person's
interest in a benefit is a 'property interest' if there are ... mutually explicit understandings
that support his claim of entitlement").
Commentators argue that "[i]f the government gives the employee assurances of con-
tinual employment or dismissal . . .then there must be a fair procedure to protect the
employee's interests when the government seeks to discharge him [or her] from the posi-
tion." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 519.
52. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 519 (protected interest may also "come from
statutory law, formal contract terms, or the actions of a supervisory person with authority
to establish terms of employment"). Whether apparent authority, as the term is used in
the common law of agency, is sufficient to establish a protected interest was not addressed
in Drigins but would probably not find a receptive audience in the Tenth Circuit given its
formalistic approach to the powers of the municipal entities and the relationship of ordi-
nances to organic charters.
53. See e.g., Continental Air Lines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987). Keenan was
hired by Continental for an indefinite term and was an at-will employee. Keenan was sum-
marily discharged and sued claiming that an employee manual created reasonable expecta-
tions of procedural due process prior to termination. The trial court granted
Continental's motion for summary judgment based on the at-will rule but the Supreme
Court of Colorado reversed and remanded.
1993]
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employment decisions "shall be made upon the.basis of merit and fit-
ness alone."' 54 Because the "for cause" language asserted by the plain-
tiff in Driggins appeared only in a city council resolution, the at-will
language of the charter in that case was dispositive. This distinction's
helpfulness is questionable. In the aggregate, the rule implied by these
cases appears to be that the quantum of protection to be afforded public
employees is to be determined solely by the source of the interest.
Under this rule, expectations created by a municipal authority are mean-
ingless unless supported by city charter provisions. A rule that excludes
property interests in continued employment as a matter of law for the
sole reason that an "at-will" or similar provision exists in the city charter
is unduly harsh and lacks logical justification. A better rule would be to
allow the question to be submitted to a jury if the plaintiff comes forth
with some evidence of a protected interest (e.g., a handbook, municipal
ordinance, policy or resolution). A per se finding of no protected interest
in any case where there is an "at-will" charter provision significantly un-
dermines the Due Process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Sufficiency of the Process
Once a plaintiff establishes a protected property interest, the issue
becomes whether the government actor provided sufficient procedural
redress to protect that property interest. The Supreme Court has pro-
vided three primary factors to be used in determining what process is
due:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and fi-
nally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
55
Establishing a plaintiff's deprivation of a protected property inter-
est does not automatically entitle that plaintiff to a formal hearing.
"What is required is procedure, not necessarily a hearing."'5 6 The
courts must balance the three factors set forth in Matthews to determine
what process is due.
1. Tenth Circuit Case Law
The Tenth Circuit considered the sufficiency of process in two cases
in 1992, West v. Grand County5 7 and Aronson v. Gressly.58 In both cases,
the court held that although the employees successfully established a
54. Patrick, 953 F.2d at 1245.
55. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
56. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 530.
57. 967 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1992).
58. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).
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protected property right, the limited procedure afforded them by the
governmental entities sufficiently satisfied due process requirements.
a. West v. Grand County
The Tenth Circuit had no trouble finding a protected property in-
terest in West v. Grand County. The county provided employee hand-
books which prohibited the discharge of permanent employees except
for cause, for reasons of curtailment of work or for 'lack of county funds.
The court held that, given these provisions, plaintiff West possessed a
protected property interest in continued employment. 59 "The record
and the case law clearly establish that West had a protected property
interest [and] was thereby entitled to due process."
'60
West's primary contention was the denial of her procedural protec-
tions as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Her supervisor, just
elected to County Attorney, cited a reduction in force as the sole reason
for her discharge. West claimed that she was the victim of subterfuge
aimed at discharging her solely because of her ties to the previous ad-
ministration.6 1 Prior to her termination, West met with the incoming
County Attorney, Coates, to discuss the reasons for her probable termi-
nation. At that time, she had an opportunity to respond to Coates as
well as to the County Commissioners concerning the proffered reasons
for her discharge. 62 This procedure, the court held, was sufficient to
satisfy due process requirements.
Citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,6 s and the Tenth Cir-
cuit cases which applied the Loudermill rule, 64 the court held that a full
evidentiary hearing was not required prior to termination in order to
comply with procedural due process. 65 Rather, the court held:
A full evidentiary hearing is not required prior to an adverse
employment action. The individual entitled to due process
protection needs only to be given notice and an opportunity to
respond. We have held that pretermination warnings and an
opportunity for a face-to-face meeting with supervisors, and a
conversation between an employee and his supervisor immedi-
ately prior to the employee's termination were sufficient to sat-
isfy constitutional requirements.
66
West argued that her post-termination hearing was constitutionally
insufficient in that: (1) she was not given the opportunity to challenge
the evidence of those seeking to terminate her; (2) the Commissioners
presiding over the hearing were not impartial; and (3) the Commission-
59. West, 967 F.2d at 366.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 367-68.
62. Id. at 368.
63. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
64. Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1989); Seibert v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Univ. of Okla. Health Sciences Ctr., 867 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1989).
65. West, 967 F.2d at 367.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
19931
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ers based their decision on ex parte communications. 6 7 In rejecting
West's arguments, the court held that the post-termination hearing af-
forded the plaintiff was sufficient to protect her property interest.
The court further held that because West did not seek to have
Coates present at the hearing, she could not complain of her inability to
confront him at that time. 68 West's attorney objected at the time of the
hearing to the fact that commissioners who were involved in the decision
to terminate West were conducting the hearing, but because the attor-
ney agreed to go forward with the hearing, the court held that he ex-
pressly waived West's right to object to the lack of impartiality of the
hearing officers.6 9 Finally, the court held that West's allegation that the
decision was a result of ex parte communication was unsubstantiated
speculation.7
°
b. Aronson v. Gressly
The Tenth Circuit had less difficulty in considering the issue of what
quantum of process is due public employees in Aronson v. Gressly.
7 1
In that case Aronson, a biographical specialist at the American Heri-
tage Center at the University of Wyoming, was terminated. 7 2 After be-
ing turned down for a promotion, allegedly because of her age, and after
having a succeeding Director of the Center redefine her position, Aron-
son refused to report to work.7" She was warned on multiple occasions
by mail that her continued insubordination would result in termination
and she continued to refuse to report for work. She was terminated on
April 25, 1988. 7 4 Aronson was reinstated as a full-time library employee
with back pay and benefits after going through the established grievance
procedures. 75 She filed suit in federal court, however, alleging depriva-
tion of her protected property interest in continued employment with-
out due process of law. 76 The trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment and Aronson appealed.
77
Applying the notice and opportunity to be heard standard of
Loudermill, the Tenth Circuit held that Aronson had been afforded ade-
quate procedure to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment:
In short, Aronson received ample opportunity to return to
work or to respond to the University's charges. Aronson
67. Id. at 369.
68. Id
69. Id. at 370.
70. Id.
71. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).




76. Id. at 909. Plaintiff alleged that the treatment she received from the University
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court granted the University's motion for




clearly had an opportunity to present her side of the story.




The court's opinion in West represents the faults in the Tenth Cir-
cuit's application of the procedural due process doctrine. Requiring
only notice and an opportunity to respond prior to termination leaves
government employees far too vulnerable to arbitrary or discriminatory
treatment, especially those who are terminated for reasons of patronage
rather than merit. Under the rule set forth in West, a reviewing court
need not delve into the substance of the process provided, but may sat-
isfy itself with the fact that some basic notice and an opportunity to re-
spond was provided prior to termination. A better rule requires courts
to make an initial inquiry into the fairness and sincerity of the proceed-
ings, making it more difficult for government employers to immunize
themselves from due process challenges by simply promulgating proce-
dures consisting more of form than substance.
In West the court's failure to consider the bias of the post-termina-
tion hearing commission is especially troubling. Plaintiff's counsel
raised the issue at the hearing and objected for the record. The court
held that the attorney's choice to proceed despite the possible bias of
the hearing officials "expressly waived" the plaintiff's right to object.79
Again, the court used unduly formalistic rules in defeating the rights of
an aggrieved government employee. If the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require a full evidentiary hearing, but
something less formal,80 it is unclear why the court insisted on holding
the plaintiff to a strict procedural standard for objection and waiver.
Clearly, if the court is not willing to require a formal hearing concerning
the property interests of government employees, then it should follow
that such employees should not be held to the strict evidentiary and pro-
cedural standards of the judicial process. West's attorney made the ob-
jection to the potential bias of the Commissioners for the record.8 '
78. Id. at 910.
79. West, 967 F.2d at 370.
"West's attorney expressed his misgivings regarding the neutrality of the com-
missioners on the panel at the grievance hearing, but then stated that he was
willing to proceed:
If the three of you were involved in the process of the decision to terminate
Trish it might be appropriate if there was a neutral arbitrator or neutral hear-
ing officer appointed to hear this grievance instead of having the commission
hear it. . . . We're prepared to present testimony. .. . I just wanted to raise
that for the record - That is a concern that we have. I'm not suggesting that
the three of you would be in any way biased or anything - it just might be an
easier situation. If you want to proceed, we're prepared.
He then proceeded without either requesting or obtaining a ruling form the Commission-
ers on his suggestion that they might not be impartial. In doing so, he expressly waived
West's right to object to the partiality of the decisionmakers at the grievance hearing." Id.
(quoting record of the grievance hearing).
80. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
81. West, 967 F.2d at 370.
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Given the informality of the required proceeding, the mere fact that the
attorney did not refuse to proceed with the hearing should not have pre-
cluded West from raising the bias issue on appeal.
Although the court in Aronson used the same low sufficiency of pro-
cess standard as it used in West, the result is more palatable. Here, Ar-
onson, through her own conduct, affirmatively rejected opportunities to
appear to answer the charges of the director of the American Heritage
Center.8 2 The several and explicit offers at procedure and reconcilia-
tion were rebuffed by Aronson and for her to then sue based on the
failure of the University to provide her with pre-deprivation due process
was properly recognized by the court as groundless.
II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA)
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act8 3 prohibits employ-
ment discrimination against individuals over 40 years of age. The act
prohibits discrimination in hiring, discharge and other acts affecting the
terms and conditions of employment based on an individual's age. Also,
retaliatory action taken by an employer against an employee who op-
poses a discriminatory practice is prohibited by the act.
8 4
In 1992 the Tenth Circuit addressed two issues affecting ADEA
claims. In Oestman v. National Farmers Union Insurance Co.,85 the court
clarified the analysis to be used in making the employee/independent
contractor distinction in the ADEA context. In Aronson v. Gressly,8 6 it
considered whether the 240-day statute of limitation for filing a claim
under Title VII8 7 also applies to ADEA cases.
A. Oestman v. National Farmers Union Insurance Co.. Employee/
Independent Contractor Distinction
Like Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
only protects employees from discriminatory treatment.8 8 The statute de-
82. Aronson v. Gressly, 961 F.2d 907, 910 (10th Cir. 1992).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1988).
84. BARBARA L. SCHLExI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 485 (2d ed.
1983).
85. 958 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992).
86. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).
87. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Specifically, the Title VII statute of
limitation is found in section 2000e-5(e).
88. Regarding prohibited employer practices, the ADEA states:
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). Almost identical language is found in Title VII:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
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fines "employee" as "an individual employed by an 'employer'." 8 9 Due
to the ambiguity and circularity of this definition, the issue determining
whether or not a plaintiff is an employee entitled to the protection of the
act or is an unprotected independent contractor is a source of much
litigation. 90
In Oestman the Tenth Circuit tried to answer this question in the
ADEA context. Plaintiff Oestman was an insurance agent with National
Farmers9 ' who filed suit in federal district court claiming a violation of
the ADEA. 92 The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that the plaintiff was an independent contractor not
subject to the protection of the Act. 93 On appeal, plaintiff argued that
the trial court erred. Had the court applied the common law control
doctrine in determining the plaintiff's employment status, it certainly
would have denied defendant's summary judgment motion.
9 4
The Tenth Circuit held that the proper test to evaluate the employ-
ment status of an ADEA plaintiff is not the common law control doctrine
but the "hybrid test."195 Although the hybrid test focuses on the em-
ployer's right to control the means and matter of the employment, simi-
lar to the common law "right to control" test, the hybrid test also takes
into account the economic realities of the relationship. 9 6 The court re-
lied upon the hybrid factors enumerated by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Spirides v. Reinhardt, a Title VII case:
9 7
(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work
usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by
a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the par-
ticular occupation; (3) whether the "employer" or the individ-
ual in question furnishes the equipment used and the place of
89. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
90. See, e.g., Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct 676 (1991).
91. Oestman, 958 F.2d at 304.
92. Id. at 303.
93. Id. at 303-04.
94. Id. at 304. The common law control doctrine is best described by section 2 the
Restatement of Agency which distinguishes servants from independent contractors:
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs
and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in
the performance of the service.
(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to
the right to control by the master.
(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of
the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (emphasis added).
95. Oestman, 958 F. 2d at 305.
96. Id.
97. 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Spirides, a Title VII sex discrimination case, the
plaintiff worked intermittently as a foreign language broadcaster for the Voice of America.
Her contract stipulated that she was to work as an independent contractor. She was paid
per assignment. She filed suit when her contract was not renewed. The trial court found
that the plaintiff was an independent contractor and granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment. The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded. Id.
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work; (4) the length of time during which the individual has
worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by the
job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is termi-
nated, i.e., by one or both parties, with or without notice and
explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether
the work is an integral part of the business of the "employer";
(9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10)
whether the "employer" pays social security taxes; (11) the in-
tentiori of the parties.98
The Tenth Circuit, following the Third Circuit in E.E.O.C. v. Zippo
Manufacturing Co. ,99 reasoned that because the substantive provisions of
the ADEA mirrored those of Title VII, the hybrid test used in Title VII
cases should be used to resolve the substantive question of what consti-
tutes an employee as opposed to an independent contractor under the
ADEA.1 00 The court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the
trial court holding that even under the hybrid test, the plaintiff was an
independent contractor and therefore ineligible for ADEA protection.
B. Aronson v. Gressly:10 1 Filing Periods
The Tenth Circuit refused to extend the Title VII analogy to the
procedural aspects of the ADEA. In Aromon the court held that the 240-
day limitation provision for Title VII actions in deferral states' 0 2 does
not apply to ADEA cases. 1
0 3
As in Title VII cases, ADEA charges must be filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory action.' 0 4 Cases that arise in states that have similar stat-
utes and agencies equipped to investigate age discrimination claims-
98. Oestman, 958 F.2d at 305 (quoting Spiris, 613 F.2d at 832).
99. 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983).
100. Oestman, 958 F.2d at 305.
101. 961 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1992).
102. A deferral state is one which has enacted anti-discrimination legislation similar to
Title VII which sets up a state equivalent of the EEOC charged with investigating unlawful
employment practices. Title VII requires claimants under that statute to allow 60 days for
the state equivalent agencies to attempt to resolve the dispute before it will receive a
charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
103. Aronson, 961 F.2d at 912. The Aronson court failed to recognize a recent step taken
by Congress to draw a closer parallel between Title VII and the ADEA. Under the statute
as originally enacted, ADEA actions had to be filled within two years of the adverse em-
ployment action except charges of willful violation of the act could be commenced within
three years. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(e), 255(a) (1988). However, in 1991, Congress amended the
Act's limitation provision, making it substantially similar to the statute of limitation of Title
VII. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626 (e) (West Supp. 1992); see also Administration & Enforcement: ADEA
suits, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 431:172 (1991).
104. The relevant section of ADEA states:
(d) Filing of charge
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60
days after a charge alleging unlawful discrinmination has been filed with the
Equal Employment Oppurtunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed-
(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or... (2)...
within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days
after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State
law, whichever is earlier.
29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d) (1988).
766 [Vol. 70:4
EMPLOYMENT LA W
known as deferral states-allow plaintiffs 300 days in which to file with
the EEOC in order to provide the state agencies ample time to investi-
gate and seek conciliation.' 0 5 Once the administrative proceedings have
terminated and the plaintiff is so notified, the plaintiff then has 90 days
to file a civil action.1
0 6
The United States Supreme Court held in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
10 7
that in deferral states Title VII requires claimants to wait 60 days after
the discriminatory practice before commencing their federal course of
redress.' 0 8 In effect, this 60-day window decreases the 300-day limit
prescribed under Title VII to 240 days.' 0 9 Because the ADEA also pre-
scribed a 300-day limit for cases arising in deferral states, the court in
Aronson was faced with the issue of whether or not the 60-day reduction
imposed in Mohasco applied to ADEA cases as well.
In Aronson, the court noted the numerous similarities between Title
VII and the ADEA. It reasoned that because the ADEA allowed claim-
ants to file with the state before or after filing with the EEOC, 1 0 the 60-
day waiting period of Title VII could not deducted from the 300-day
statute of limitations of the ADEA.III Therefore, the 300-day limit set
forth in the Act controlled the actions and Plaintiff's ADEA claim filed
on day 246 was not time barred.1
2
C. Analysis
Title VII and the ADEA are substantially similar in their substantive
prohibitions of discrimination and the Tenth Circuit has joined other
courts in holding that substantive ADEA issues can be resolved by anal-
ogy to Title VII precedent. The Tenth Circuit has adopted the Title VII
framework to determine the method of proof required under the
ADEA.' 11 It is therefore logical that the analogy be used to determine
other substantive questions, including how to make the employee/in-
dependent contractor distinction. It is sound judicial policy to utilize
105. Id. § 626(d)(2).
106. Administartion & Enforcement: ADEA suits, 8 Fair Empi. Prac. Manual (BNA) 431:172
(1991).
107. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
108. Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 816-17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 706(c)).
109. Id. at 814 n. 16; see SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 82, at 490.
110. Aronson, 461 F.2d at 911 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756
n.4 (1979)).
The court in Aronson took notice of the fact that under the ADEA the federal EEOC
and the state equivalents are to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over age discrimination
claims. In Title VII cases the state is granted a 60-day period of exclusive jurisdiction and,
therefore, the claimants are prohibited from filing with the EEOC during such time.
ADEA claimants, conversely, may file with the EEOC before or after the state has investi-
gated the claim. Therefore, because claimants are not required to wait 60 days before
filing with the federal agency, the 300-day limitation should not be reduced to 240 days as
it is in Title VII deferral cases. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 911-12
113. The court adopted the Title VII McDonnel Douglas/Burdine test of disparate
treatment in the ADEA context in Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cir.
1988).
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the substantive similarity of the statutes in order to avoid the accumula-
tion of an entirely separate and often duplicative body of case law in
order to interpret the ADEA.
There are, however, significant disparities between the procedural
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA. Because the procedural aspects
of the acts differ substantially, the analogy is less helpful in that area.
The Supreme Court in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 114 recognized that the
concurrent administrative jurisdiction provisions were intentionally in-
cluded by Congress to expedite the processing of age discrimination
suits. Congress intended to give older Americans faster access to re-
dress than was available under the sequential procedure of Title VII.
"The premise for this difference is that the delay inherent in sequential
jurisdiction is particularly prejudicial to the rights of 'older citizens to
whom, by definition, relatively few productive years are left.' "115
Given the intentional differences in procedures, binding ADEA
plaintiffs to the 240-day limitation period to which Title VII plaintiffs are
bound would ignore the clear intent of the Congress.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1992, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals continued to erode
public employees' rights by strictly interpreting the "property" provi-
sion of the Due Process Clause and creating a rudimentary baseline pro-
cedural requirement to satisfy constitutional demands. The court
continued to delineate the analytical process to be used by courts in in-
terpreting and applying the ADEA, borrowing the substantive case law
of Title VII but correctly refusing to impose that statute's rigid proce-
dural requirements on ADEA plaintiffs.
Daniel Grossman
114. 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
115. Id. at 757 (quoting 113 CONG. REC. 7076 (1967)(remarks of Sen. Javits)).
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